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 1  UN Security Council Resolution 1564 ( 2004 )  12 . 
 2  The Commission of Inquiry into the Post Election Violence began on 23 May 2008 with 
an announcement published in the Kenya Gazette Notice No 4473 vol cx-no 41. 
 3  The International Commission of Inquiry on Libya was created by the Human Rights 
Council at its 15 th session on 25 February 2011 by Resolution S-15/1, UN Doc A/HRC/S-
15/1, 11. The International Commission of Inquiry on C ô te d ’ Ivoire was established by UN 
Human Rights Council Resolution 16/25 on 13 April 2011, UN Doc A/HRC/RES/16/25, 10. 
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 7.1. INTRODUCTION 
 ON 18 SEPTEMBER 2004, the United Nations (UN) Security Council requested the Secretary General to appoint an international com-mission of inquiry in order to investigate reports of violations 
of international humanitarian law and human rights law in Darfur. 1 In 
February 2008, the Kenyan government decided to establish an interna-
tional commission of inquiry to provide recommendations on the meas-
ures in bringing to justice those persons responsible for acts of violence 
that occurred immediately after the presidential elections results were 
announced. 2 In 2011, the Human Rights Council decided to dispatch two 
commissions of inquiry on the allegations of serious violations of human 
rights law that occurred in Libya and Ivory Coast. 3 
 These commissions were vested with the authority to make a fi rst legal 
evaluation of the facts that occurred in the situations in question. Despite 
the fact that they were established by different bodies and had to deal with 
very different contexts, their mandates presented a common denominator: 
they received an  accountability driven-mandate . Indeed, rather than being 
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mere fact-fi nding missions they were instructed to identify the alleged 
perpetrators of international violations and ensure that they were held 
accountable. 
 This chapter critically assesses the relationship between the Sudan, 
Kenya, Libya, and Ivory Coast commissions of inquiry and the Interna-
tional Criminal Court (ICC). Such commissions were tasked to investigate 
allegations of international violations within the context of situations that 
are still open before the ICC. Therefore, this study examines the mandate 
and work of these commissions vis- à -vis (pre-trial) decisions of the ICC. In 
so doing, it aims to explore whether and to what extent the commissions ’ 
investigations impacted upon the different phases of the ICC ’ s pre-trial 
proceedings, namely from the referral of a situation to the confi rmation 
of charges. Since no case related to the situations in Sudan, Kenya, Libya 
and Ivory Coast has been completed, this study does not investigate the 
weight of the commissions ’ information at the trial stage. 
 In light of this ambition, section 7.2 provides a brief description of the 
evolution of the role of international commissions of inquiry from plain 
fact-fi nding to (quasi) judicial bodies, entrusted with the authority to pro-
vide legal evaluation of the relevant facts and secure prosecution-oriented 
criminal evidence. Section 7.3 offers a general overview on the use of 
international criminal law by international commissions of inquiry since 
1993. It examines how international criminal law has been applied not 
only by those UN Commissions which were explicitly instructed to assess 
the perpetration of international crimes, but also by fact-fi nding missions 
whose mandate was confi ned to ascertaining violations of international 
human rights law and international humanitarian law. 
 Following a presentation of the main international criminal law fi nd-
ings by the commissions of inquiry in Sudan, Kenya, Libya and Ivory 
Coast (section 7.4), section 7.5 provides the fi rst comprehensive analysis 
of the relevant pre-trial jurisprudence related to the situations in ques-
tion, in order to assess the signifi cance of the commissions ’ sources in 
the different phases of the ICC proceedings. In particular, it shows how 
the commissions ’ information, although not binding on the ICC, played 
a key role within the context of both pre-investigative and investigative 
phases before the Court. In light of the relevance that commissions ’ doc-
uments assumed in the decisions to issue arrest warrants or summons 
under  Article 58 of the Rome Statute, Section 7.6 argues the necessity that 
the Prosecutor does not heavily rely on the fact-fi nding sources. As fact-
fi nding missions ’ information appeared very persuasive to the decisions 
under Article 58, this section recommends that the Prosecutor submit the 
application for an arrest warrant or summons only if she is able to conduct 
an independent investigation, producing evidence which might corrobo-
rate third-party fi ndings. 
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 4  For a detailed historical-comparative analysis of commissions of inquiry, see  LJ  van den 
Herik ,  ‘ An Inquiry into the Role of Commissions of Inquiry in International Law :  Navigating 
the Tensions between Fact-Finding and Application of International Law ’ ( 2014 )  13  Chinese 
Journal of International Law  507 . See also  LJ  van den Herik and  C  Harwood ,  ‘ Sharing the 
Law :  The Appeal of International Criminal Law for International Commissions of Inquiry ’ in 
 P  Alston and  S  Knuckey (eds),  The Transformation of Human Rights Fact-Finding ( Oxford , 
 Oxford University Press ,  2016 )  233 . 
 5  UN General Assembly Resolution 46/59 ,  Declaration of Fact-Finding by the United Nations 
in the Field of the Maintenance of International Peace and Security 1991 ,  UN Doc A/RES/46/59 
( 9 December 1991 )  1 . 
 7.2. THE EMERGING SYNERGY BETWEEN FACT-FINDING 
MISSIONS AND INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE: 
THE COMMISSION OF EXPERTS ON THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA 
 The functions of international commissions of inquiry have signifi cantly 
evolved in the last 30 years. Traditionally, the role of commissions was con-
fi ned to making factual determinations, in order to encourage the peaceful 
resolution of international disputes. 4 As enshrined in Article 9 of the 1907 
Hague Convention for the Pacifi c Settlement of International Disputes, 
when an international dispute exists because of a difference of opinion 
on points of fact, states should establish an international commission of 
inquiry to  ‘ facilitate a solution of these differences by elucidating the facts 
by means of an impartial and conscientious investigation ’ . The role of fact-
fi nding missions was confi ned to the presentation of fi ndings of a factual 
nature, while the possibility of drawing legal conclusions exceeded the 
commissions ’ mandates. 
 The Charter of the United Nations confi rms this traditional understand-
ing of fact-fi nding missions as enshrined in the 1907 Hague Conventions. 
In particular, according to Article 33 of the UN Charter, fact-fi nding mis-
sions may constitute a distinct means for the resolution of a dispute. The 
UN organs may, therefore, rely on detailed fact-fi nding to gather informa-
tion, which could be useful for exercising effectively their role in restoring 
and maintaining international peace and security. 
 The 1991 Declaration on Fact-fi nding by the United Nations in the Field 
of the Maintenance of International Peace and Security recognised this 
function of fact-fi nding missions: 
 In performing their functions in relation to the maintenance of international 
peace and security, the competent organs of the [UN] should endeavour to have 
full knowledge of all relevant facts. To this end they should consider undertak-
ing fact-fi nding activities. 5 
 The establishment of a Commission of Experts for the former Yugosla-
via (Yugoslavia Commission) in 1993 represented a turning point, as it 
introduced a new model of commission vested with authority to investi-
gate violations of international law and recommend measures to ensure 
174 Triestino Mariniello
 6  UN Security Council Resolution 780 (1992), UN Doc S/RES/780 (1992) (6 October 
1992) 2. 
 7  ibid. 
 8  Interim Report of the Commission of Experts Established Pursuant to Security Council Resolu-
tions 780 (1992) ,  UN Doc S/25274 ( 10 February 1993 ) ( Yugoslavia Interim Report ). 
 9  Final Report of the Commission of Experts Established Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 
780 (1992) ,  UN Doc S/1994/674 ( 27 May 1994 ) ( Yugoslavia Final Report ). 
 10  Yugoslavia Final Report (n 9). 
 11  M  Frulli ,  ‘ Fact-Finding or Paving the Way to Criminal Justice ? Some Refl ections on the 
UN Commissions of Inquiry ’ ( 2012 )  10  Journal of International Criminal Justice  1323, 1327 . 
 12  See the  Yugoslavia Interim Report (n 8) 51 – 53 and the ICTY Statute, Art 7. 
 13  Frulli (n 11) 1327. 
 14  Yugoslavia Final Report (n 9) 311. 
accountability for those violations. 6 Indeed, the Yugoslavia Commission 
was entrusted by the UN Security Council with the power to inquire into 
violations of the Geneva Conventions and other violations of international 
humanitarian law committed in the territory of the former Yugoslavia. 7 
The same Commission decided to extend its analysis into violations of 
international criminal law and recommended the establishment of an 
international criminal tribunal (ICT). 8 In so doing, it performed the inves-
tigation in order to secure prosecution-oriented criminal evidence. The 
Commission also clarifi ed legal concepts related to the investigated facts, 
such as genocide, crimes against humanity, command responsibility, supe-
rior orders, reprisals, rape and other forms of sexual assault. 9 
 The interim report of the Commission triggered the establishment of 
the fi rst ICT after Nuremberg and Tokyo. 10 Although there was no formal 
institutional link between the Commission and the International Criminal 
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), the Commission ’ s work had a 
signifi cant infl uence on the law and practice of the Court. 11 With respect to 
the applicable law, the ICTY Statute included legal formulations, as indi-
cated by the Commission of Inquiry. This is true in relation to the defi ni-
tion of command responsibility and the concept of superior orders, which, 
as suggested by the commissions, do not represent a ground to exclude 
criminal liability of the subordinate, but may be taken into account as a 
mere mitigating circumstance. 12 With regard to the infl uence on the prac-
tice of the ICTY, the Prosecutor could start his work on the basis of the 
material collected by the Commission of Experts. As argued by Frulli,  ‘ the 
fi ndings of the Commission contributed greatly to a quick and effi cient 
start of the work of the ICTY prosecutor, who took offi ce almost fourteen 
months after the establishment of the ICTY ’ . 13 
 In particular, the relevance of the information collected by the Commis-
sion to the ICTY lay in the fact that it revealed that grave breaches of the 
Geneva Conventions and other violations of international humanitarian 
law had been committed on a large scale. 14 In addition, the Commission 
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 15  Yugoslavia Final Report (n 9) pt IV, section F. 
 16  PG  Alston ,  ‘ The Criminalization of International Human Rights Fact-Finding ’ (Key 
Note Address at the Conference on Fact-fi nding on Gross Violations of Human Rights Dur-
ing and After Confl icts ,  Oslo ,  Norwegian Centre for Human Rights ,  17 – 18 November 2011 ) . 
For a critical analysis of this process of  ‘ criminalisation ’ of international commissions of 
inquiry, see Ch 6: C Schw ö bel-Patel,  ‘ Commissions of Inquiry: Courting International Crimi-
nal Courts and Tribunals ’ . 
 17  See, inter alia, UN Security Council Resolution 935 (1994), Commissions of Experts for 
Rwanda (1 July 1994); Darfur Commission (n 1); Independent International Commission of 
Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic, UN Doc A/HRC/S-17/L.1 (22 August 2011); Commis-
sion of Inquiry on Human Rights in the Democratic People ’ s Republic of Korea (DPRK), UN 
Doc A/HRC/RES/22/13 (21 March 2013). 
 18  See, inter alia, Libya Commission (n 3); UN Human Rights Council Resolution S-9/1, 
Independent Commission of Inquiry on the 2014 Gaza Confl ict (12 January 2009). For a 
detailed analysis of the migration of international criminal law concepts into the work of 
international commissions of inquiry, see also,  D  Jacobs and  C  Harwood ,  ‘ International 
Criminal Law outside the Courtroom :  The Impact of Focusing on International Crimes for 
the Quality of Fact-Finding by International Commissions of Inquiry ’ in  M  Bergsmo (ed), 
 Quality Control in Fact-Finding ( Torkel Opsahl Academic EPublisher ,  2013 )  325 . 
provided a signifi cant contribution to the investigation of international 
violations as it found the systematic nature of the commission of rape and 
sexual assault. 15 
 7.3. THE USE OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW BY INTERNATIONAL 
COMMISSIONS OF INQUIRY: A GENERAL OVERVIEW 
 The vast majority of UN commissions of inquiry established since 1993 
followed on from the Yugoslavia experience, as their mandates were no 
longer confi ned to factual determinations, but also included the possibil-
ity for providing legal evaluations, in particular to investigate whether the 
relevant facts constituted violations of international law. It can be argued 
that the Yugoslavia Commission started a process of  ‘ juridifi cation ’ or 
 ‘ criminalisation ’ of commissions of inquiry, 16 instructed to go beyond the 
ascertainment of the responsibilities of legal entities as states and non-
state armed groups and make a preliminary evaluation of the facts based 
on international legal parameters, so that individuals who were responsi-
ble for the violations are held accountable. 
 Some commissions were expressly requested to ascertain whether the 
investigated facts amounted to international crimes. 17 Other commissions 
were instructed to assess international humanitarian law and human 
rights violations. 18 Still, they decided to cover also alleged violations of 
international criminal law, on the basis of the possibility of framing inter-
national humanitarian law and human rights violations as international 
crimes. 
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 19  Rwanda Commission (n 17). 
 20  The Report of the Commission was fi nalised on the 9 December 1994, whilst the ICTR 
had already been established on 8 November 1994. See  Final Report of the Commission of Experts 
Submitted Pursuant to Resolution 935 (1994) ,  UN Doc S/1994/1405 ( 9 December 1994 ) Annex. 
 21  ibid. 
 22  Darfur Commission (n 1). 
 23  Syria Commission (n 17) 12. 
 24  See DPRK Commission (n 17) 5. 
 25  UN Human Rights Council ,  Report of the International Commission of Inquiry to investigate 
all Alleged Violations of International human rights law in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya ,  UN Doc A/
HRC/17/44 ( 1 June 2011 )  23 ( Libya Report ). 
 With respect to fact-fi nding missions established to assess the perpetra-
tion of international crimes, for instance, a few months after the Yugoslavia 
Commission the UN Security Council requested the Rwanda Commis-
sion to gather evidence of grave violations of international humanitar-
ian law committed in the territory of Rwanda, including the evidence of 
 possible acts of genocide (emphasis added). 19 In contrast to the Yugoslavia 
experience, it does not appear that the Rwanda Commission played any 
role in prompting the establishment of the international criminal tribu-
nal. Indeed, the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda was estab-
lished before the submission of the Commission ’ s fi nal report. 20 However, 
the fi nal fi ndings of the Commission confi rmed that genocide and other 
systematic, widespread and fl agrant violations of international humani-
tarian law had been perpetrated in Rwanda. 21 Similarly, the Darfur Com-
mission was instructed, inter alia, to ascertain whether acts of genocide 
had occurred, 22 while the Syria Commission was tasked with identifying 
those responsible for international violations, particularly crimes against 
humanity. 23 The Democratic People ’ s Republic of Korea Commission was 
mandated to  ‘ investigate systematic, widespread and grave violations 
of human rights, with a view to ensuring full institutional and personal 
accountability, in particular where violations may amount to  crimes against 
humanity (emphasis added). ’ 24 
 Other commissions were established to determine alleged violations of 
international humanitarian law and/or human rights violations. How-
ever, even if their mandates did not explicitly include international crimi-
nal law, these commissions also investigated allegations of international 
crimes. The commissions justifi ed their decisions to exceed their mandates 
by stressing that international criminal law constitutes an enforcement 
measure for serious violations of human rights and international humani-
tarian law. For instance, the International Commission of Inquiry for 
Libya stated that international criminal law is the  ‘ means of enforcement 
at the international level of penalties for grave violations of customary 
law, [human rights] and serious violations of [international humanitarian 
law] which are recognized as attracting individual liability ’ . 25 
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 26  Report of the United Nations Fact-Finding Mission on the Gaza Confl ict ,  UN Doc A/
HRC/12/48 ( 25 September 2009 )  286 . 
 27  Report of the Commission of Inquiry on Human Rights in Eritrea , UN Doc A/HRC/29/42 
(4 June 2015) 8. 
 28  ibid. 
 29  Report of the international fact-fi nding mission to investigate violations of international law, 
including international humanitarian and human rights law, resulting from the Israeli attacks on the 
fl otilla of ships carrying humanitarian assistance ,  UN Doc A/HRC/15/21 ( 27 September 2010 ) 
 265 . 
 30  See  The Commission on Human Rights ,  Report of the Fourth Special Session ,  E/CN.4/
RES/1999/S-4/1 ( 27 September 1999 ) . 
 31  Report of the International Commission of Inquiry on East Timor , UN Doc A/54/726, 
S/2000/59, 148. 
 The so-called Goldstone Commission, instructed to investigate viola-
tions of international humanitarian law and human rights during the 
Gaza Confl ict, found that: 
 International criminal law has become a necessary instrument for the enforce-
ment of IHL and (human rights). Criminal sanctions have a deterrent function 
and offer a measure of justice for the victims of violations. The international 
community increasingly looks to criminal justice as an effective mechanism 
of accountability and justice in the face of abuse and impunity. The Mission 
regards the rules and defi nitions of international criminal law as crucial to the 
fulfi lment of its mandate to look at all violations of IHL and IHRL by all parties 
to the confl ict. 26 
 The Eritrea Commission of Inquiry explicitly admitted that its mandate 
was confi ned to investigate only violations of human rights and, as such, 
did not establish whether such violations amounted to international 
crimes. 27 However, it concluded that international crimes might have been 
committed and recommended further investigations. 28 
 The commission established by the UN Human Rights Council to inves-
tigate violations of international humanitarian law and human rights law, 
resulting from the interception by Israeli forces of the humanitarian aid 
fl otilla bound for Gaza (Flotilla Commission), concluded that these vio-
lations constituted (war) crimes under Article 147 of the Fourth Geneva 
Convention. 29 
 In the proposal to establish a fact-fi nding mission in East Timor, the 
same UN Commission on Human Rights clearly stated that  ‘ all persons 
who committed or authorised violations of human rights or international 
humanitarian law were individually responsible and accountable for 
those violations ’ . 30 In its fi nal report, the East Timor Commission stated 
that victims have a right to an effective remedy for violations of human 
rights, which includes also the state ’ s responsibility to use criminal law 
measures against those responsible of such violations. 31 
 Several fact-fi nding missions established after the Yugoslavia Commis-
sion received an explicit accountability driven-mandate, since they were 
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 32  The Commission was created by UN Security Council Resolution 1012 ,  UN Doc 
S/RES/1012 ( 28 August 1995 ) . 
 33  See UN Doc A/HRC/25/L.1/Rev.1, 10(b). 
 34  The Group of Experts for Cambodia was established pursuant to UNGA Resolution 
52/135 ( 27 February 1998 ) , UN Doc A/RES/52/135(1). 
 35  See UN Doc S/RES/2127 (2013). 
 36  On 28 September 2009, a violent crackdown on a pro-democracy rally in the Guinean 
capital of Conakry resulted in the deaths of at least 150 people as well other violent incidents. 
The Commission was mandated to establish the facts and circumstances of the events of 
28 September 2009 and the related events in their immediate aftermath, qualify the crime 
perpetrated, determine responsibilities and, where possible, identify those responsible. See 
 Letter from the Secretary General ,  UN Doc S/2009/556 ( 28 October 2009 ) . 
instructed to ensure that those responsible of such violations were held 
accountable. For instance, the Burundi Commission was also established 
to recommend measures to bring to justice persons responsible for  ‘ the 
assassination of the President of Burundi on 21 October 1993, the massa-
cres and other related serious acts of violence ’ , 32 and the Sri Lanka Com-
mission was requested to investigate allegations of the crimes perpetrated 
in order to avoid impunity and ensuring accountability. 33 The Cambodia 
Commission was mandated to  ‘ determine the nature of the crimes com-
mitted by Khmer Rouge leaders ’ and  ‘ to explore legal options for bringing 
them to justice before an international or national jurisdiction ’ . 34 
 Occasionally, this accountability-driven mandate included also the 
authority to identify those responsible for the crimes committed. The Cen-
tral African Republic Commission, established by the UN Security Council 
in 2013, was entrusted with the identifi cation of perpetrators of violations 
of international humanitarian law and international human rights law, 
and the assessment of their possible criminal responsibility, with a view to 
ensuring that those responsible were held accountable. 35 The 2009 Guinea 
Commission was established to ascertain which crimes had been commit-
ted and identify their perpetrators. 36 
 7.4. ACCOUNTABILITY-DRIVEN MANDATES IN PRACTICE: THE CASES OF 
SUDAN, KENYA, IVORY COAST AND LIBYA 
 The UN commissions of inquiry in Sudan, Libya, and Ivory Coast were 
also instructed to ensure accountability and identify the alleged perpetra-
tors of international violations. Before assessing the relationship between 
commissions of inquiry and international criminal proceedings, the next 
section will briefl y discuss the fi ndings of these fact-fi nding missions, as 
they investigated the alleged commission of international crimes within 
the context of situations that are still open before the International Crimi-
nal Court. For the same reason, the analysis will cover also the work of the 
Impact of CoIs on ICC Proceedings 179
 37  Report of the International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur to the United Nations Secretary-
General ( 25 January 2005 )  14 ( Darfur Report ). 
 38  Darfur Report (n 37) 518. 
 39  Darfur Report (n 37) section VI (1 – 6). 
 40  Darfur Report (n 37) 74 – 76. 
 41  Darfur Report (n 37) section VI (1 – 6). 
international commission of inquiry in Kenya, the so-called Waki Commis-
sion, which signifi cantly paved the road to international criminal justice. 
 In line with the evolution of the role and functions of commissions of 
inquiry post-1993, beyond being plain fact-fi nding missions, these com-
missions were called to ensure that those responsible for heinous conduct 
were brought to justice. As we will analyse in the following subsections, 
the mandate of the Darfur Commission provided that it had to identify 
the perpetrators of violations of international humanitarian law and 
human rights law with a view to ensuring that those responsible were 
held accountable. In Kenya, according to the terms of reference, the Com-
mission had to issue recommendations on the measures with regard to 
bringing to justice those persons responsible for acts of violence occur-
ring immediately after the presidential elections results were announced. 
The Libya Commission had to identify those responsible for violations of 
international human rights law and ensure that those individuals respon-
sible were held accountable. In Ivory Coast, the Commission also had to 
identify those responsible for serious abuses and violations of human 
rights law committed in C ô te d ’ Ivoire following the presidential election 
of 28 November 2010. 
 7.4.1. The UNSC Darfur Commission 
 The Darfur Commission admitted that in classifying the facts according 
to international criminal law, it adopted an approach proper to a judicial 
body. 37 It excluded the commission of genocide, as it stressed that attack-
ing, killing and forcibly displacing members of some tribes was not perpe-
trated in order to annihilate, in whole or in part, a racial, ethnic, national 
or religious group, as required by the genocide defi nition. 38 However, 
the Commission concluded that the investigated facts amounted to war 
crimes and crimes against humanity. 39 With respect to these core crimes, 
the Commission provided a detailed analysis of their contextual elements 
and underlying offences. Indeed, it reported the existence of the armed 
confl ict for war crimes, 40 and of widespread or systematic attacks against 
the civilian population for crimes against humanity. 41 It also defi ned the 
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 42  Darfur Report (n 37) 74 – 76. 
 43  Darfur Report (n 37) 238 – 68. 
 44  Darfur Report (n 37) section VI (1 – 6). 
 45  Darfur Report (n 37) section VI (1 – 6). 
 46  Darfur Report (n 37) 645. 
 47  Darfur Report (n 37) 525. 
 48  The Report of the Commission of Inquiry into Post-Election Violence was handed over to 
president Mwai Kibaki and Prime Minister Raila Odinga on 15 October 2008 ( Kenya Report ). 
 49  Kenya Report (n 48). 
nature of the confl ict, in order to establish which set of rules of interna-
tional humanitarian law were applicable in each case. 42 
 The Commission also found that most attacks were deliberately and 
indiscriminately directed against civilians. 43 Moreover, it relied on the 
jurisprudence of ad hoc tribunals and the Statute of the ICC in classify-
ing the relevant facts as underlying offences of international crimes. 44 In 
particular, it ascertained the perpetration of underlying offences of war 
crimes and crimes against humanity, such as killing of civilians, torture, 
enforced disappearances, destruction of villages, rape and other forms of 
sexual violence, pillaging and forced displacement. 45 
 The Commission claimed its authority not only to fi nd material per-
petrators of alleged crimes but also those who bore the greatest respon-
sibility. Therefore, it identifi ed a number of possible suspects for serious 
violations of international human rights law and international humanitar-
ian law. However, it decided to withhold the names of these suspects from 
the public domain, on the basis of 
 1) the importance of the principles of due process and respect for the rights of 
the suspects; 2) the fact that the Commission has not been vested with investiga-
tive or prosecutorial powers; and 3) the vital need to ensure the protection of 
witnesses from possible harassment or intimidation. 46 
 The list of likely suspects of international crimes was fi led with the UN 
Security Council, with the recommendation that it should have been 
delivered to the ICC Prosecutor for future investigations and possible 
indictments. 47 
 7.4.2.  The International Commission of Inquiry into the Post-Election 
Violence in Kenya 
 In Kenya, the so called Waki Commission of Inquiry reached the conclu-
sion that crimes against humanity had been committed in Kenya after the 
2007 presidential elections. 48 In particular, the Commission found that 
murder, destruction of property, serious injuries, sexual violence, and 
forcible transfer of population had been perpetrated. 49 According to the 
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 55  Libya Report (n 25). 
 56  Report of the International Commission of Inquiry on Libya ,  UN Doc A/HRC/19/68 
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 57  Final Libya Report (n 56) pt III (A – D). 
 58  Final Libya Report (n 56) pt III (B, D, F). 
Commission, criminal cases should have been brought against persons 
bearing greatest responsibility for these crimes. 50 The Commission exten-
sively described that the post-election violence was not a mere juxtapo-
sition of citizen-to-citizen opportunistic assaults, but it found that there 
were systematic attacks on civilians based on their ethnicity and political 
leanings. 51 These fi ndings were crucial to show that acts of violence in 
Kenya could amount to international crimes, as they were not sporadic 
or isolated. Indeed, the widespread or systematic nature of the attacks 
against the civilian population, which constitutes the contextual element 
of crimes against humanity under the Article 7 of the Rome Statute, draws 
a borderline between crimes against humanity falling within the jurisdic-
tion of the ICC, and ordinary crimes, which are punishable only before 
domestic courts. The Commission also recommended the establishment of 
a special tribunal to prosecute crimes as a result of post-election violence. 52 
 Similar to the Darfur Commission, the Waki Commission identifi ed a 
list of alleged perpetrators and decided to not publish the list with names 
of alleged perpetrators in its report. 53 This list was placed in a sealed enve-
lope, which was sent to the Panel of African Eminent Personalities, with 
the recommendation to forward the names of likely suspects to the Pros-
ecutor of the ICC, if the proposed special tribunal had not been set up. 54 
 7.4.3. The UNHRC Libya Commission 
 The Libya Commission classifi ed the investigated facts as international 
crimes. In its fi rst report, the Commission had already found that Gadhafi  
forces had used excessive force against demonstrators in February 2011. 55 
In the fi nal report, the Commission concluded that Gadhafi  forces had 
committed crimes against humanity and war crimes in Libya. 56 According 
to the Commission, acts of murder, enforced disappearance and torture 
had been perpetrated within the context of a widespread or systematic 
attack against a civilian population. 57 The Commission also established 
additional violations as unlawful killing, individual acts of torture and 
ill-treatment, attacks on civilians, and rape. 58 The fact-fi nding mission 
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 59  Final Libya Report (n 56) 810. 
 60  Final Libya Report (n 56) 810. 
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 62  Final Libya Report (n 56) 779 – 784. 
 63  Final Libya Report (n 56) 760. 
 64  See UN Doc A/HRC/16/L.33 (18 March 2011) 10. 
 65  Rapport de la Commission d ’ enqu ê te Internationale Ind é pendante sur la C ô te d ’ Ivoire ,  UN Doc 
A/HRC/17/48 ( 1 July 2011 ) ( Ivory Coast Report ). 
 66  Ivory Coast Report (n 65) 91. 
stated also that the anti-Gadhafi  forces (Thuwar) were responsible for war 
crimes and breaches of international human rights law. 59 These forces, 
according to the Commission ’ s fi ndings, had committed unlawful killing, 
arbitrary arrest, torture, enforced disappearance, indiscriminate attacks, 
and pillage. 60 
 The Commission also assessed the Libyan legislation and judicial 
system. In particular, it found that the domestic legislation did not ade-
quately provide for the prosecution of international crimes. 61 In addition, 
it established that Libya lacked a functioning justice system, so that inter-
national crimes would have likely been unpunished. 62 Lastly, the Libya 
fact- fi nding mission decided not to include the names of the alleged per-
petrators of international crimes in the fi nal report, apart from senior fi g-
ures who are publicly known. The Commission sent the confi dential list of 
the alleged responsible for international violations to the High Commis-
sioner for Human Rights. 63 
 7.4.4. The UNHRC Ivory Coast Commission 
 As mentioned above, the Ivory Coast Commission was established to 
investigate the facts and circumstances surrounding the allegations of 
serious abuses and violations of human rights committed in C ô te d ’ Ivoire 
following the presidential election of 28 November 2010, in order to iden-
tify those responsible for such acts and to bring them to justice. 64 The 
Commission did not confi ne its role to assessing violations of human 
rights law, but also covered violations of international humanitarian law 
and international criminal law. 65 Even if more superfi cially compared to 
other commissions examined in this section, the Ivory Coast Commis-
sion provided a legal characterisation of these abuses, by determining 
that war crimes and crimes against humanity had been committed at the 
relevant time. With regard to crimes against humanity, the Commission 
established that serious crimes such as murder and rape had been perpe-
trated within the context of a widespread and systematic attack against 
the civilian  population, which was targeted on the basis of their supposed 
 ethnicity or political sympathies. 66 
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 67  Ivory Coast Report (n 65) 92 – 93. 
 68  Ivory Coast Report (n 65) 92 – 93. 
 69  UN Security Council Resolution 1970 (2011) ,  UN Doc S/RES/1970(2011) ( 26 February 
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 The Commission did not provide detailed fi ndings on why the 
 post-election period amounted to a non-international armed confl ict. Still, 
it concluded that some of the investigated abuses such as violence to life 
and person, cruel treatment and torture and humiliating and degrad-
ing treatment amounted to serious violations of common Article 3 to the 
Geneva Conventions, and as such, constituted war crimes under Article 
8 of the Rome Statute. 67 The Commission stressed that other serious vio-
lations of the laws and customs applicable in armed confl icts had been 
committed, such as intentionally directing attacks against the civilian pop-
ulation not taking direct part in hostilities, intentionally directing attacks 
against buildings, material, units and medical transports, attacks inten-
tionally directed against personnel, installations, material, units or vehi-
cles involved in a peace-keeping mission, intentionally directing attacks 
against buildings dedicated to religion, education and hospitals, looting 
of towns and villages, as well as rape and other forms of sexual violence. 68 
 7.5. COMMISSIONS OF INQUIRY AS NEW ACTORS ON 
THE STAGE OF THE ICC 
 Before moving to an assessment of the impact of the work of commissions 
of inquiry on the ICC, it is necessary to remove the work of the Libya from 
the scope of this research. Indeed, although the scenario addressed by the 
Commission is the same of the Situation open before the ICC, I believe 
the investigation of the Libya fact-fi nding mission did not assume any 
relevance to the proceedings before the ICC. The investigation in Libya 
displays a lack of cooperation between the Commission of Inquiry and 
the ICC, as well as among other UN bodies, namely the Security Council 
and the Human Rights Council. The same Commission admitted that it 
consulted with the Court, but at the same time it stated no information 
had been shared with the ICC. Indeed, the UN Security Council referred 
the situation in Libya to the ICC the day after the Human Rights Council 
had established the Commission. 69 Therefore, it appears that the work of 
the Libya commission of inquiry did not infl uence the Security Council ’ s 
choice of referring the situation to the ICC. In other words, the UN Secu-
rity Council ’ s decision to trigger the ICC ’ s jurisdiction under Article 13(b) 
was taken independent of the fi ndings of the Commission. 
 In addition, the Prosecutor ’ s decision to initiate the investigation 
was taken with unprecedented expeditiousness, only seven days after 
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the  Security Council ’ s referral. The same report of the Commission was 
 published two weeks after the Prosecutor had submitted a request for 
three arrest warrants to the Pre-Trial Chamber. 70 Thus, the Prosecutor did 
not have the possibility to use the Commission ’ s report in supporting his 
request for warrants of arrest against Muammar Gaddafi , Abdullah Al 
Sanussi, and Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi . 
 Therefore, this section will focus on the relationship between the ICC 
and the Sudan, Ivory Coast and Kenya Commissions. In order to assess the 
impact of the commissions ’ sources on international criminal proceedings, 
it is necessary to discuss separately the different pre-trial stages before the 
ICC: (i) triggering the jurisdiction of the Court; (ii) authorisation of the 
investigation; (iii) issuance of arrest warrant or summon to appear; (iv) 
confi rmation of the charges; (v) admissibility of the cases. 
 7.5.1. Triggering the ICC Jurisdiction 
 The UN Security Council, a state party or the Prosecutor may trigger the 
ICC ’ s jurisdiction. 71 The Sudan Situation was referred to the ICC by the 
Security Council, 72 while in both the Kenya and Ivory Coast contexts 
the Prosecutor decided to initiate an investigation using his  proprio motu 
powers under Article 15. 73 In the Sudan, Kenya and Ivory Coast Situations, 
the Commissions ’ reports constituted the basis of the allegations leading 
to criminal prosecutions before the ICC. The detailed assessment of facts, 
which were made in particular by the Sudan and Kenya Commissions, 
raised the necessity of further investigation by the ICC Prosecutor and the 
need to ensure accountability for alleged international crimes committed. 
 Indeed, the Darfur Commission ’ s work prompted the Security Council 
to approve Resolution 1593 (2005), which activated the jurisdiction of the 
ICC. 74 The Security Council was persuaded by the detailed report of the 
Cassese Commission that international crimes had allegedly been com-
mitted. Therefore, the Commission ’ s fi ndings on the necessity of further 
investigations to be conducted by an international Prosecutor convinced 
the Security Council to approve its fi rst referral to the ICC under Article 
13(b) of the Rome Statute. 
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 The Kenya situation can be considered as an emblematic example of 
the strict cooperation between the ICC and the Commission of Inquiry. 
Indeed, the Waki Commission had handed over a sealed envelope naming 
the suspects to former UN Secretary General Kofi  Annan, requesting him 
to deliver the envelope to the ICC Prosecutor should the Kenyan author-
ities fail to establish a special court to try the likely suspects of crimes 
committed during the post-election violence. 75 It was only following the 
failure by domestic authorities to establish this special tribunal that the 
ICC Prosecutor decided to use his powers under Article 15 of the Statute. 76 
Prior to this decision, the Prosecutor had agreed with the Kenyan gov-
ernment to not intervene, if the Special Tribunal had been established in 
order to seek accountability against persons bearing the greatest responsi-
bility for crimes, particularly crimes against humanity, relating to the 2007 
 General Elections in Kenya. 77 After receiving the sealed envelope and sup-
porting material compiled by the Commission, on 26 November 2009 the 
ICC Prosecutor requested the Pre-Trial Chamber II to grant the authorisa-
tion to start an investigation on the crimes against humanity allegedly 
committed during the post-election violence in Kenya. 78 In his request for 
the authorisation under Article 15, the same Prosecutor extensively used 
the Commission ’ s allegations regarding the perpetration of crimes against 
humanity in Kenya. 
 With respect to the Ivory Coast Situation, the UN Commission ’ s report 
is not the main fact-fi nding document, as it constituted one of several 
materials submitted by third parties investigating the post-election vio-
lence in Ivory Coast. Together with reports presented by a number of non-
governmental organisations, the Commission ’ s materials were used by 
the Prosecutor as evidence for the contextual elements of an  ‘ attack ’ for 
the purposes of establishing the commission of crimes against humanity, 
and of a non-international armed confl ict with regard to the existence of 
war crimes. 79 
 7.5.2. Decision of the Pre-Trial Chamber to Authorise the Investigation 
 Article 15(4) of the Rome Statute provides that 
 If the Pre-Trial Chamber, upon examination of the request and the support-
ing material, considers that there is a reasonable basis to proceed with an 
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 investigation, and that the case appears to fall within the jurisdiction of the 
Court, it shall authorise the commencement of the investigation … 
 In light of the low standard of proof required at this stage of proceedings, 
all the evidentiary materials presented by the Prosecutor are subject to a 
minimum judicial review by the competent Pre-Trial Chamber. 
 In its decision to authorise the investigation into the Ivory Coast situa-
tion, the Pre-Trial Chamber II accepted the Prosecutor ’ s request. 80 In line 
with the OTP allegations, the Chamber made a signifi cant use of the Com-
mission ’ s report to establish that there was a reasonable basis to believe 
that the contextual element of war crimes, consisting of the existence of an 
armed confl ict of a non-international character, was met. 81 
 The Waki Commission ’ s report had a noteworthy infl uence on the same 
decision of the Pre-Trial Chamber authorising the Prosecutor to initiate the 
investigation in Kenya. 82 First, the Pre-Trial Chamber used the Commis-
sion ’ s sources to defi ne the temporal, material and territorial parameters 
of the investigation, which could have been conducted by the Prosecutor. 83 
Second, the fact-fi nding mission ’ s report assumed signifi cant relevance to 
the Pre-Trial Chamber ’ s ascertainment of the  chapeau elements of crimes 
against humanity, as: (i) the attack directed against the civilian popula-
tion; 84 (ii) the organisational policy; 85 (iii) the widespread and systematic 
nature of the attack; 86 (iv) the link between the individual conduct and the 
attack. 87 Similarly, the Chamber relied on the Commission ’ s information 
also to establish that there was a reasonable basis to believe that murder, 
rape, forcible transfer, and other inhumane acts causing serious injuries 
had been committed within the context of the widespread and systematic 
attack against the civilian population. 88 
 7.5.3. Issuance of Arrest Warrant and Summons to Appear 
 As already mentioned, the Sudan, Kenya, and Ivory Coast Commissions 
each submitted a list of alleged perpetrators of international crimes to the 
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 95  Prosecutor v William Samoei Ruto, Henry Kiprono Kosgey and Joshua Arap Sang , Decision on 
the Confi rmation of Charges Pursuant to Article 61(7)(a) and (b) of the Rome Statute, ICC-
01/09-01/11-373 2 (23 January 2012) 69. 
ICC Prosecutor. However, they decided to keep these lists confi dential. 
Whether the people identifi ed by the Prosecutor as alleged perpetrators 
were the same as those listed in the commissions ’ materials is a matter of 
speculation. However, we cannot fail to note that the profi le of the likely 
suspects identifi ed by the commissions is very similar to those people 
prosecuted before the ICC. This is true with regard to the Darfur Commis-
sion, which pointed to the responsibility of members of the government 
and Janjaweed Militias for crimes against humanity and war crimes. 89 
Indeed, since 2009, most senior leaders of the State and Janjaweed have 
been accused by the Prosecutor of international crimes. 90 The Commission 
had also stressed the responsibility of members of two rebel groups: the 
Sudan Liberation Army (SLA) and Justice for Equality Movement (JEM). 
In line with the Commission ’ s fi ndings, in 2010, the Prosecutor started an 
investigation against Banda and Jerbo, considered as the military com-
manders respectively of JEM and SLA. 91 
 In Ivory Coast, the relationship between the Commission ’ s work and 
the suspects against whom the Prosecutor brought a case appears evident. 
Indeed, the public report frequently mentioned the role played by the for-
mer President of Ivory Coast, Laurent Gbagbo, and Charles Bl è Goude ’ , 
former Minister of Youth Affairs. 92 In particular, the Commission reported 
the involvement of the militias and mercenaries working for Gbagbo in 
the commission of abuses during the post-election violence. 93 Gbagbo and 
Goud è were committed to trial in 2014. 94 
 It is worth to remembering that third party fact-fi nding sources con-
stitute indirect evidence, whose probative value appears to be suffi cient 
in order to establish the standard of proof under Article 58, namely that 
there are reasonable grounds to believe that the suspect has committed 
the crimes falling within the Rome Statute. Indirect evidence encom-
passes hearsay evidence, reports of international and non-governmental 
organisations (NGOs), as well as reports from national agencies, domestic 
intelligence services and the media. 95 Similar to the stage of proceedings 
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regarding the authorisation to open an investigation under Article 15, 
Article 58 entails a low standard of proof and low level of judicial over-
sight in terms of arrest warrant or summons to appear. Article 58 of the 
Rome Statute provides two requirements for the issuance of a warrant 
of arrest: there must be reasonable grounds to believe that a person has 
committed a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court and that an arrest 
is necessary. If the arrest warrant is not deemed necessary, as one of the 
three conditions provided under Article 58(1)(b) should fail, a summons 
to appear may be issued. 96 The issuance of an arrest warrant or summons 
to appear marks the beginning of a case before the ICC. 
 As stated in the  Lubanga and  Katanga cases, the fi rst limb for the pur-
poses of the issuance of an arrest warrant is a two-fold test, which requires 
that there are reasonable grounds to believe: (1) that one of the crimes 
within the ICC jurisdiction has been committed; and (2) that the alleged 
perpetrator is criminally liable for such a crime under one of the modes of 
liability enshrined in the Rome Statute. 97 
 An examination of the different cases related to the Situation in Sudan 
show how the commission of inquiry ’ s information assumed signifi cant 
probative value in establishing the perpetration of one of the crimes 
within the jurisdiction of the ICC. In the Darfur cases, the OTP had nota-
bly relied on the Cassese Commission ’ s material in its applications under 
Article 58. 98 In the application for an arrest warrant against Hussein, the 
evidence provided by the OTP included open source material, witness 
statements, material obtained from the Darfur Commission of Inquiry, 
and documents provided by the government of Sudan. 99 In the applica-
tion for summons to appear in the  Harun and  Kushayb case, the Prosecutor 
admitted to having  ‘ benefi ted greatly from the information furnished by 
the UNCOI ’ and the National Commission of Inquiry. 100 The Prosecution 
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( 30 November 2011 ) . 
stated that he had  ‘ evaluated the conclusions of the UNCOI and the NCOI, 
and the materials underlying the fi ndings of those commissions ’ . 101 
 In light of this, the Pre-Trial Chamber mainly followed the Prosecutor ’ s 
reasoning and recognised the relevance of the Commission ’ s sources to the 
issuance of the arrest warrants. Still, a signifi cant difference between the 
Chamber ’ s fi ndings and the Prosecutor ’ s application is related to the crime 
of genocide. Indeed, in the fi rst arrest warrant decision against Al Bashir, the 
Pre-Trial Chamber appeared more persuaded by the Commission ’ s fi ndings 
when it rejected the Prosecutor ’ s submissions that there were reasonable 
grounds to believe that genocide had been committed in Darfur. 102 
 In particular, in the  Al Bashir case, the Pre-Trial Chamber I used the Com-
mission ’ s materials to establish the contextual element and the underlying 
offences of both war crimes and crimes against humanity. 103 In the Darfur 
cases, the Pre-Trial Chamber I relied on the Commission ’ s sources, not 
only to fi nd that there were reasonable grounds to believe that crimes had 
been committed, but also in order to establish a link between the perpetra-
tion of these crimes and the alleged perpetrators. 104 
 It appears more problematic to establish the weight of the commissions ’ 
fi ndings in the Kenya and Ivory Coast cases. This is due to the fact that 
the prosecutorial applications for summons to appear in the Kenya cases 
are heavily redacted, 105 while the OTP ’ s request for arrest warrants related 
to the situation in Ivory Coast are still under seal. This prevents us from 
knowing which types of evidence have been presented and in particular, 
the role that the commissions ’ documents may have played in supporting 
the Prosecutor ’ s applications. 
 Nevertheless, in the case against Gbagbo, it is the Pre-Trial Chamber ’ s 
decision on the arrest warrant to reveal that the Prosecutor had mainly 
relied on third party sources, in particular reports by several NGOs. 106 
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In line with the Prosecutor ’ s application, the Commissions ’ information, 
together with a number of documents provided by NGOs, was persua-
sive to the Pre-Trial Chamber III ’ s fi ndings, particularly with regard to 
the establishment of a widespread or systematic attack against the civilian 
population and of individual conduct constituting crimes against human-
ity, as inhumane acts and murder. 107 In the case against Simone Gbagbo, 
in the establishment of criminal liability for the crimes alleged by the Pros-
ecutor, the Chamber used, inter alia, the UNHRC ’ s report to conclude that 
the suspect had played a key role in recruiting, arming and integrating 
thousands of volunteers and enlisting them into the Defense and Security 
Forces FDS chain of command. 108 
 7.5.4. Confi rmation of Charges 
 The confi rmation of charges constitutes one of the main innovations intro-
duced by the drafters of the Statute in the fi eld of international criminal 
justice. 109 Statutes of other international or internationalised criminal tri-
bunals do not contain such a procedure. The confi rmation of charges is 
the stage at which a Pre-Trial Chamber makes a determination whether 
the case is to be sent for trial. 110 The Prosecutor and the Defence are the 
parties to the confi rmation procedure and, as such, they may submit their 
evidence and call witnesses. 111 Pursuant to Article 61(6) of the Statute, the 
suspect may also object to the charges, challenge the evidence presented 
by the Prosecutor and submit evidence. In addition, victims who have suf-
fered personal harm linked to the charges against the accused may partici-
pate in the confi rmation proceedings through their legal representatives. 112 
 In contrast to the arrest warrant or summons to appear procedure, the 
confi rmation of charges is deliberately envisaged as an adversarial hear-
ing, whereby the person charged has the right to be present and con-
test the evidence before a Pre-Trial Chamber composed of three judges. 
Thus, ICC Pre-Trial Chambers are vested with the authority to assess 
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 evidence, including the power to determine its relevance, admissibility, 
and weight. 113 
 These factors characterising the confi rmation of charges procedure —
 the higher standard of proof, the judicial scrutiny of the evidence sub-
mitted by the parties and the role of the Defence, who can challenge the 
prosecutorial evidence — have the effects of reducing the impact of indi-
rect evidence, including the commissions ’ information, on the decision to 
commit an individual to trial. The Darfur cases have not reached the stage 
of confi rmation of charges before the ICC. However, the Kenya and Ivory 
Coast decisions on the confi rmation of charges reveal how third party fact- 
fi nding sources have a lesser weight in the proceedings, if compared to the 
previous stage relating to the arrest warrant or summons to appear. 114 
 In the Kenya cases, the Chamber clarifi ed that the decision on the confi r-
mation of charges cannot be based solely on a piece of indirect evidence, 115 
whilst a single piece of direct evidence may be decisive for the Chamber ’ s 
determination. 116 According to the Chamber,  ‘ more than one piece of indi-
rect evidence, which has low probative value, is preferable to prove an 
allegation to the standard of substantial grounds to believe ’ . 117 
 Saying that, in both cases, it appears that the majority (Judge Trenda-
fi lova and Judge Tarfusser) used the commissions ’ materials as corrob-
orating evidence of witness statements submitted by the Prosecutor. In 
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particular, in the case against Muthaura, Kenyatta and Ali, the Pre-Trial 
Chamber found the Commission ’ s documents persuasive as corrobo-
rating evidence in relation to the underlying offences of crimes against 
humanity, murder, deportation and other inhuman acts. 118 
 In the  Gbagbo case, the Pre-Trial Chamber adopted an even stricter 
approach in the assessment of the probative value of indirect evidence 
for the confi rmation of charges. 119 The Chamber expressed its concern 
that the Prosecutor had relied heavily on NGO reports and press articles 
with regard to key elements of the case, including the contextual elements 
of crimes against humanity. 120 The Chamber found that these pieces of 
indirect evidence did not constitute the fruits of a proper investigation 
conducted by the Prosecutor in accordance with Article 54(l)(a) of the Stat-
ute. 121 According to the majority of judges sitting in the Pre-Trial Cham-
ber, NGO reports and press articles may be a useful means to clarify the 
historical context of a confl ict situation. 122 However, they do not usually 
constitute a valid substitute for the type of evidence that is required to 
meet the evidentiary threshold for the confi rmation of charges. 123 This is 
due to the fact that NGOs reports are mainly based on anonymous hear-
say, which cannot be investigated and challenged by the Defence. The 
Chamber also expressed its doubts that anonymous hearsay contained in 
NGOs ’ reports could be useful to corroborate other types of indirect evi-
dence, since it is problematic to establish whether these sources are truly 
independent of each other. 124 
 7.5.5. Admissibility 
 The Darfur Commission condemned the inaction of both the Sudanese 
authorities and the rebels to prosecute and try those allegedly responsi-
ble for the serious crimes committed. 125 It found that the government had 
not put in place any real and effective response to large-scale criminal-
ity linked to the armed confl ict. 126 Therefore, considering the nature of 
international crimes, which are committed by state offi cials or with their 
complicity, as well as the shortcomings of the Sudanese criminal justice 
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system, the Commission concluded that Sudan was unwilling and unable 
to prosecute and try the alleged offenders. 127 The Kenya Report empha-
sised the weaknesses and diffi culties of the domestic criminal justice sys-
tem to investigate and prosecute crimes allegedly committed during the 
post-election violence. 128 The Ivory Coast Commission highlighted that 
domestic authorities had failed to adopt any measures to put an end to 
impunity. 129 
 This type of information by fact-fi nding commissions on states ’ unwill-
ingness to prosecute and investigate alleged perpetrators of serious crimes, 
or on the state of domestic justice systems, may be very useful in making 
a preliminary evaluation of the admissibility of a case before the ICC. The 
ICC could be called to deal with questions related to the admissibility from 
early stages of the proceedings up until trial. At the situation stage, the 
prosecutorial decision to start the investigation and prosecution entails 
also the evaluation of the admissibility of the case under Article 17. 130 Sim-
ilarly, the Pre-Trial Chamber ’ s authorisation for the Prosecution to start 
the investigation under Article 15 encompasses also the examination of 
the admissibility conditions. At this stage of the proceedings, where there 
is no identifi ed suspect, the admissibility test requires an assessment as to 
whether the state is conducting, or has conducted, national proceedings in 
relation to a potential case, namely in relation to the groups of persons and 
the crimes allegedly committed during those incidents. 131 Therefore, the 
material provided by fact-fi nding commissions might be crucial in provid-
ing signifi cant information on whether the relevant state is willing and/or 
able to investigate and prosecute certain categories of potentially accused, 
as those identifi ed as alleged perpetrators by the same commissions. 
 Therefore, commissions of inquiry ’ s fi ndings might also be used by 
the ICC to evaluate the quality and state of a domestic judicial system, in 
order to establish its capability to conduct effective criminal proceedings. 
Indeed, as it stems from the detailed reports in Darfur and Kenya, the 
work of the commissions ’ may provide the ICC with useful insights on 
the shortcomings of a domestic judicial system, which would be unable 
to carry out impartial criminal proceedings, also in light of the general 
security situation. 
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 7.6. A CONCLUDING APPRAISAL OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN 
FACT-FINDING SOURCES AND ICC PROCEEDINGS 
 This paper assessed the infl uence of the information provided by com-
missions of inquiry on the pre-trial proceedings before the ICC. Even if 
commissions ’ material is not binding on international criminal tribunals, 
their investigations appeared to be very persuasive with regard to the 
Prosecutor ’ s decisions as well as to the Chamber ’ s fi ndings. The analy-
sis conducted in section 7.5 shows how the signifi cance of the material 
provided by commissions of inquiry before the ICC varies in the course 
of proceedings on the basis of the rising standards of proof. As indirect 
evidence, fact-fi nding materials appeared to have a stronger impact on 
the ICC during those preliminary phases of the proceedings that require 
the lowest standards of proof to be satisfi ed. Indeed, the Rome Statute 
establishes four different, progressively higher, evidentiary thresholds in 
Articles 53(1)(a), 58(1), 61(7) and 66(3). 132 The lowest test is provided in 
the early stage of the proceedings, namely, in Article 53(1)(a) regarding the 
initiation of an investigation, where the Prosecutor has to assess whether 
or not there is a  ‘ reasonable basis to believe that a crime within the jurisdic-
tion of the Court has been or is being committed ’ (emphasis added). 133 
At the next, higher, standard the issuance of a warrant of arrest pursuant 
to Article 58(1) requires that there are  ‘ reasonable grounds to believe that 
the person has committed a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court ’ . 
Situated immediately above, there is Article 61(7) providing a  ‘ substantial 
grounds to believe ’ test for the purposes of the confi rmation of charges. 
Finally, the highest threshold is enshrined in Article 66(3), according to 
which  ‘ in order to convict the accused, the Court must be convinced of the 
guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubts ’ . 
 By providing the fi rst comprehensive analysis of the relevant pre-trial 
jurisprudence related to the situations in Sudan, Kenya, and Ivory Coast, 
this paper confi rms Stahn and Jacobs ’ argument that the impact of fact-
fi nding sources decreases in the progression of the proceedings. 134 They 
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also bring into the picture other factors, such as  ‘ the prosecutorial discre-
tion in relation to choice of situations and cases, the scope of defendants ’ 
rights and the balance between Judge-led- and Prosecution-led inquiry ’ . 135 
In other words, the relevance of commissions ’ information is more signifi -
cant during those stages of proceedings where the Prosecutor enjoys more 
discretion and the Defence does not have the possibility to challenge the 
evidence submitted by fact-fi nding commissions. This is true in relation 
to the phase related to the prosecutorial choice of situations to investigate, 
when formally a suspect has not yet been identifi ed. By contrast, the use 
of commissions ’ investigations starts to appear less signifi cant at the con-
fi rmation of charges stage of proceedings, which is deliberately envisaged 
as an adversarial hearing, whereby the person charged has the right to be 
present and contest the evidence before a Pre-Trial Chamber composed of 
three judges. 
 Therefore, the work of the commissions of inquiry constituted a signifi -
cant source at the pre-investigative phase, by offering a general overview 
of the situation, and revealing the (alleged) existence of the contextual ele-
ments of international crimes. With a focus on the situations in Sudan, 
Kenya and Ivory Coast, this study examined how the commissions ’ 
sources assumed, even if in different degrees, relevance to paving the way 
to proceedings before the ICC. In Sudan, the Commission ’ s investigation 
played a key role within the context of the UN Security Council ’ s decision 
to refer the situation to the ICC. The examination of the situation in Kenya 
showed the strict cooperation between the Commission and the Court. 
The Commission ’ s information had a signifi cant weight on the Prosecu-
tor ’ s decision to open an investigation, by using his  proprio motu powers 
under the Article 15 of the Rome Statute. With respect to the Ivory Coast, 
the relevance of the UN commission of inquiry ’ s information to the ICC ’ s 
proceedings appeared less evident. Still, the commission of inquiry ’ s 
information constituted one of the several reports by third parties, which 
were used by the Pre-Trial Chambers in order to authorise the Prosecution 
to open the investigation. 
 In addition, this chapter assessed also the role of commissions ’ materials 
during the investigative stage before the ICC. It ascertained that the deci-
sion by the Pre-Trial Chamber under Article 58 was strongly infl uenced by 
third party sources, as it follows an  ex parte application conducted with the 
absence of the Defence, which cannot object to the relevance and admis-
sibility of the evidence. Particularly in the Darfur cases, the commissions ’ 
information was used not only to establish that there were reasonable 
grounds to believe that the crimes had been committed, but also to estab-
lish the link between this commission and the alleged perpetrators. 
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 To conclude, as commissions ’ sources appeared to assume a central rel-
evance in the issuance of arrest warrants or summons to appear under 
Article 58, it is important that commissions of inquiry are provided with 
clear and transparent guidelines and procedures, considering, in most cir-
cumstances, the anonymous and unknown nature of the witnesses. How-
ever, it is no less certain that commissions of inquiry are not mandated to 
establish whether individuals are guilty. Thus, in the application for an 
arrest warrant, it is of the utmost importance that the Prosecutor does not 
become a mere rubber stamping of commissions ’ fi ndings or, more gener-
ally, that she does not only rely on inferences or types of indirect evidence. 
She should rather always be able to corroborate with her own evidence 
the information of the commissions of inquiry. 
 This is necessary in light of the strong impact that the issuance of the 
arrest warrant has on the fundamental rights of an individual, by bring-
ing a restriction to his personal liberty. The deprivation of personal lib-
erty could also last for a long time before the Pre-Trial Chamber decides 
whether or not to confi rm the charges. In addition, an arrest warrant or 
summons issued by international criminal tribunals may also have strong 
political implications, when the alleged perpetrator is a political leader. 136 
Also, with respect to the application under Article 58, the fact-fi nding 
sources should always be corroborated by the Prosecutor ’ s own evidence, 
considering that the commissions ’ information is confi ned to the ascer-
tainment of the contextual elements and actus reus of international crimes, 
whilst it generally puts little emphasis on the attribution of criminal liabil-
ity. 137 Indeed, in establishing that the investigated facts amount to interna-
tional crimes, the fulfi llment of further elements of international crimes, 
such as modes of liability and mens rea, receives very poor attention by 
fact-fi nding missions. 
 
 
